Cover: PLC cybersecurity: the 7 jobs to do, in order, on a machine
Tempo di lettura: 11 minuti

Quick answer. For the people who program and commission machines, PLC cybersecurity comes down to seven jobs, in this order: know what is on the network, lock down access to the CPU with users and passwords, separate the machine network from the plant network, open remote access only when it is needed, decide on updates by reading the vendor’s advisories, keep a backup you have actually restored, and switch off the services nobody uses. This page is the map; each item links to the article that covers it in full.

Printable sheet. The checklist on one page, with a check question for each item: S7-1500 hardening sheet (PDF).

First question: security or safety?

“PLC safety” and “PLC security” get mixed up all the time. Safety protects people from the machine: emergency stops, light curtains, the fail-safe program. Security protects the machine from people who should not be touching it: someone downloading a block, someone logging in remotely with an account that should have been deleted a year ago. This guide is only about security.

The password on the safety program is a different password, tied to the fail-safe part of the project. The passwords that matter here decide who can read, write and download to the CPU.

The two topics do meet. In 2017, according to the FBI, the TRITON malware was used against the safety controllers of a petrochemical facility in the Middle East. A safety system is still a computer running a program.

Who does what

The ISA guide to IEC 62443 separates the asset owner, who is ultimately accountable for the system, from the integration service provider, who designs, configures, tests, commissions and hands over. In practice: the settings on the CPU, the HMI panel and the remote access gateway are yours; the plant network and its firewall rules belong to the customer. Put that in the handover documents.

Example scenario: Line P1

Every example in this series uses the same fictional plant: Line P1, a palletizing line that does not exist.

Device Address What we care about
S7-1500 PLC 192.168.10.10 firmware, users, active services
Comfort HMI panel 192.168.10.20 how it authenticates to the CPU
ET 200SP remote I/O 192.168.10.31 and 192.168.10.32 firmware, location in the cabinet
Two SCALANCE XB005 switches — unmanaged: no VLAN to configure
Service laptop 192.168.10.100 who uses it, what runs on it, where the project lives
Remote access gateway 192.168.10.2 who opens it, for how long, who closes it
Plant network 10.20.0.0/16 the customer’s, not yours

PLC cybersecurity: the checklist, in order

# Item On Line P1 Where to go next
1 Asset inventory 6 IP addresses, 2 switches, firmware of every device NIS2 (OT inventory)
2 Passwords and access levels users on CPU 192.168.10.10, password for confidential configuration data Protecting an S7-1500
3 Segmentation boundary between 192.168.10.x and 10.20.0.0/16 Segmentation and firewalls
4 Remote access gateway 192.168.10.2 closed by default PLC remote access
5 Updates advisories for the order number of each device Siemens PLC advisories
6 Backup TIA project, CPU backup, licenses, tested restore PLC and HMI backup
7 Unused services web server, OPC UA, SNMP, PUT/GET on the CPU this page and Protecting an S7-1500

1. Asset inventory: know what you have

CISA defines an asset inventory as an organized, regularly updated list of systems, hardware and software, built from a physical inspection and a logical survey. Its high-priority attributes include IP address, MAC address, manufacturer, model, ports and services, protocols, user accounts and physical location. Firmware version is only medium priority in the CISA guide. On an S7-1500 we would put it first, because the firmware decides which protections you can turn on (see item 2).

On Line P1 you write it with the TIA project open and the cabinet door open: six addresses, two switches, one firmware version per row. No active scans on a running line. NIST SP 800-82 asks for “extreme caution”, because active scans can make devices unstable, and says they should be scheduled during planned outages whenever possible.

The inventory is also where PLC cybersecurity meets the law: in the Italian baseline measures for NIS2, the word OT appears exactly once, in the hardware inventory requirement. More in NIS2 and industrial automation: what changes for programmers.

In the Italian baseline measures for NIS2, the word OT appears once, in the hardware inventory.

2. Passwords and access levels

From TIA Portal V19 with CPU firmware V3.1, S7-1500 controllers use a user management model called UMAC. Users are created under “Security settings > Users and roles” in the project tree; access control is switched on in the CPU properties under “Protection & Security > Access control”, option “Enable access control”, which is on by default. The main rights are “HMI access”, “Read access” and “Full access”. Full access is the one that covers downloading blocks and hardware configuration, test functions and firmware updates.

On Line P1 the panel at 192.168.10.20 is the awkward part. Siemens states that TIA Portal V19 does not support user-based access control for PLC-HMI communication, only passwords. We found nothing saying whether that still holds in V20 or V21: check on your version.

Know-how protection hides the code, but it does not stop anyone copying, deleting or loading the block: that is in the 2014 edition of the S7-1500 system manual. What stops a download, in our reading, is access control. Then there is the password for confidential PLC configuration data, introduced with STEP 7 V17. Siemens allows one password for a group of CPUs and warns that if one is compromised, all of them are exposed. The full walkthrough is in protecting an S7-1500 PLC with passwords and access levels.

How to check it is a test we suggest, not a Siemens procedure: on the bench, from a programming device with no credentials, try a download to the CPU. It must be refused. The 2014 manual says the CPU logs correct and incorrect password entries in the diagnostics buffer, so look there afterwards.

3. Segmentation: the machine does not live on the office network

NIST SP 800-82 calls for firewall rules that only permit connections between adjacent levels. The January 2026 guidance on secure connectivity for OT (NCSC-UK, CISA and partner agencies) describes the flat-network problem: a contractor who connects over VPN to their own equipment can reach every other device on the network too.

On Line P1 the boundary sits between 192.168.10.x and the plant network 10.20.0.0/16. The two switches are SCALANCE XB005: the XB-000 family manual lists no web or SNMP diagnostics, and it mentions VLANs only in the technical specifications, as transparent forwarding of IEEE 802.1Q tags. The way we read it, a switch with no management interface has nowhere to configure a VLAN: either you replace the switch, which is a cost line, or a firewall does the separation. The diagram and rule table are in network segmentation and firewalls for a PLC machine.

4. Remote access: open when needed, closed by a named person

The same guidance says every connection with the OT environment should be initiated outbound from inside OT, and that vendor support should go through a gateway in a separate segment such as a DMZ; where possible, connectivity is enabled only when required. NIST says to remove access when it is no longer needed and to consider automatic timers. CISA’s May 2025 primary mitigations call for VPN with a strong password and phishing-resistant MFA, and for disabling dormant accounts.

On Line P1 the gateway at 192.168.10.2 stays closed. It opens for a job, and closing it is the responsibility of a person with a name, not “at the end of the job”. Architecture and typical mistakes are in secure remote access to a PLC: VPN and what not to do.

5. Updates: decide by reading the advisory

For Siemens product vulnerabilities, read Siemens ProductCERT. CISA announced that from 10 January 2023 it no longer updates its Siemens advisories beyond the initial release, and points to ProductCERT for current information. Siemens’ operational guidelines give three possible outcomes: no action because existing measures are enough, additional external measures, or new firmware.

Sometimes there is no fix. Advisory SSA-482757 lists some S7-1500 CPUs in ET 200SP format (for example the 1510SP-1 PN, 6ES7510-1DJ01-0AB0; these are CPUs, not I/O modules like the two ET 200SP stations on Line P1) as “Currently no fix is planned”. The mitigation it points to is physical: only trusted personnel near the device, locked cabinets.

If you do update, NIST says to do it during planned outages; the 2014 manual warns that the CPU goes to STOP (check on your version). How to read an advisory line by line: Siemens PLC vulnerabilities: reading an advisory and deciding.

6. Backup: it only counts if you have restored it

NIST asks for a list of all backups, including installation media and license keys, an off-site copy and restore testing.

On Line P1 that means the TIA project with PLC and panel, the CPU backup taken with “Online > Load backup from online device”, the licenses, and the installer for the TIA version the project was built with. Note the link to item 2: from firmware V4.1, a CPU backup can only be restored with the same confidential-data password that was set when the backup was made. If only one person knows it, the backup depends on that person. The rest is in PLC and HMI backup: recovering after ransomware.

7. Unused services: switch off what nobody uses

Siemens’ guidelines say only the services that are actually required should be active, and default passwords must be changed at commissioning. The data, from the S7-1500 Communication Function Manual (11/2025):

Service Port Default Can it be switched off?
S7 / PG-HMI (ISO-on-TCP) 102/TCP on no
PROFINET Context Manager 34964/UDP on no
Web server 80, 443/TCP off yes, CPU properties
OPC UA 4840/TCP off yes, “OPC UA > Server”
SNMP 161/UDP on up to FW V2.9, off from V3.0 yes, “Advanced configuration > SNMP”
Modbus TCP 502/TCP off enabled by the user program

Three notes. From firmware V3.1, PUT/GET is disabled by default. Turning SNMP off also removes some network topology diagnostics, for example with PRONETA. And a CPU from V3.0 up, loaded with a project made for older firmware, behaves like the old CPU: SNMP on, “public” and “private” community strings in plain text. That is exactly what happens with spare parts.

Where IEC 62443 and NIS2 fit

The ISA/IEC 62443 series is organized in four groups of documents. For integrators, the ISA guide points to parts 2-1, 2-3, 2-4, 3-2 and 3-3. One requirement from 3-3, quoted in the guide, deserves a place on every engineering office wall: access control shall not prevent the operation of essential functions. If the operator cannot start the line, the measure is wrong. The parts that matter are in IEC 62443 for PLC programmers.

On NIS2, two facts. We searched for “62443” in the directive, in Italy’s implementing decree (Legislative Decree 138/2024) and in the Italian baseline measures: it does not appear; and according to Italy’s national cybersecurity agency (ACN), supplying a NIS entity does not by itself bring you into scope, but obligations reach you through contracts. If you are a machine builder that is not a small enterprise, you can yourself be an important entity under ACN’s reading (substantive activity in NACE division 28); the obligations cover your own information and network systems, not the machines you sell. That a PLC falls under the legal definition of a “network and information system” is our reading, not a sentence in the law. This is not legal advice. Details in NIS2 and industrial automation.

What not to do

  • Run an active scan on a production line network “to see what’s there”.
  • Use the same confidential-data password on every CPU for every customer, or keep it in one person’s head.
  • Leave the remote access gateway always open, with an account for a technician who has since changed jobs.
  • Fit a spare CPU with newer firmware, load the old project and assume the new protections kick in by themselves.

Limits of this guide

  • It covers Siemens S7-1500 with TIA Portal. Other vendors have different mechanisms: read their manuals, don’t reason by analogy.
  • Features depend on the TIA version and the CPU firmware. Menu paths come from Siemens manuals dated November 2025 (TIA V21, firmware V4.1); where we cite the 2014 system manual, check on your version.
  • The full text of IEC 62443 was not read for this guide: quotes come from the ISA introductory guide.
  • This is not legal advice.

Sources

Last checked: 29 September 2026.

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