Quick answer. PLC remote access is secure when the connection starts inside the plant and goes out, never the other way round; when the person coming in has a name, a second factor and only the rights the job needs; and when access is opened for one intervention and closed by someone with a defined role. The VPN is the pipe. The rest is architecture, and a port forward to port 102 on the PLC has no place in it.
In particolar modo vedremo:
What this article covers, and what it doesn’t
You won’t find VPN client set-up steps here. That’s a configuration job, and it depends on the gateway you bought. This article sits one step earlier: where the connection terminates, who gets in, with which rights, for how long, and what record is left afterwards.
The recommendations come from the official sources listed at the end: NIST, CISA with its partner agencies, and Siemens. Where a source doesn’t say something, I say so. For the wider picture, start with the practical PLC cybersecurity guide for machine programmers.
PLC remote access: why a port forward to the PLC is the wrong answer
A port forward opens a port on the router that leads straight to an internal address. It is an inbound connection, started from outside. The Secure connectivity principles for OT, published in January 2026 by NCSC-UK with CISA, the FBI and other agencies, ask for the opposite: «All connections with the OT environment should be initiated as outbound connections from within the OT environment.»
There’s also a CPU detail many programmers miss. On the S7-1500, the ISO-on-TCP service that TIA Portal and HMI panels use on port 102/TCP «cannot be deactivated», according to the Siemens Communication Function Manual (11/2025 edition). You can’t switch it off to shrink the exposed surface. All you can decide is who reaches it, and a port forward to 102 hands that decision to anyone who finds the public address.
Ruling out port forwarding is my conclusion from the two facts above: the connection must start from inside, and the service that would stay exposed can’t be turned off.
There is no switch for port 102 on an S7-1500: the ISO-on-TCP service cannot be deactivated.
Questions to answer before picking a product
NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3 puts the principle in one line: «Remote access should be provided only if justified and limited to what is required for the business need.» It adds that remote access should not bypass the safety and security controls already in place. On site, that turns into five questions.
Who gets in
A named person, not «service» or «remote». NIST lists «Implementing unique usernames and complex passwords» and removing default credentials. The 2026 CISA/NCSC principles want connectivity to be «user aware», so that actions leave an employee-specific audit trail, and want permissions tied to joiners, movers and leavers processes. The engineer who changes employer must lose access the day they leave. CISA’s May 2025 mitigations add: «disable dormant accounts».
Which rights on the PLC
From TIA Portal V19 with S7-1500 firmware V3.1, local user management (UMAC) assigns rights per user. The Siemens UMAC document describes three levels:
- HMI access: HMI access and diagnostics data only; tags can be read and written from an HMI device;
- Read access: read-only access to configuration and blocks, RUN/STOP, setting the time of day;
- Full access: downloading blocks and hardware configuration, test functions, RUN/STOP, firmware updates.
A remote engineer who needs to read an alarm or watch a block online doesn’t need Full access. Careful, though: Read access isn’t read-only, because it can put the CPU in STOP. If the person coming in must not be able to put the CPU in STOP, the right is HMI access. But HMI access writes tags, so a stop command that goes through a tag is still within reach. CISA’s mitigations call it least privilege «for the specific asset and user role or scope of work». If a download is needed, grant it for that job and take it away afterwards. Setting up users, roles and levels is covered in how to protect an S7-1500 PLC with passwords and access levels.
One limit worth knowing: in TIA V19, communication between an HMI panel and the PLC doesn’t support user-based access control, only passwords. I found nothing in writing on whether V20 or V21 changed this. Check on your version.
How they prove who they are
The sources use different verbs here, so I quote them as they are. NIST: multi-factor authentication «should be considered». The 2021 CISA/FBI advisory on DarkSide ransomware: «Require multi-factor authentication for remote access to OT and IT networks.» CISA’s 2025 mitigations ask for a VPN with a strong password and «phishing-resistant» MFA. The 2026 principles: «Access to human-to-machine connectivity should require MFA».
On the CPU, the Siemens web server manual (11/2025) gives one method for local users: «For CPUs only possible via the password.» So the second factor isn’t something you ask the PLC for. It belongs at the entry point, before the engineer can see the machine network.
For how long
The 2026 principles call for just-in-time access: «enabling connectivity only when required and disabling it otherwise». NIST suggests automatic timers that remove access, or a change process that confirms the removal by hand. As a compensating control it also mentions call-back: the site calls the authenticated engineer, not the other way round.
The CPU has one piece of this. Among the fields of a local UMAC user is «Runtime timeout», the period of inactivity after which the user is logged out of the device. The source is the web server manual, and it doesn’t say whether this also applies to a TIA Portal online session: test it on the bench before relying on it. The expiry you can count on is closing the tunnel.
Then you need a switch. In its control appendix NIST writes that the ability to disconnect or disable remote access «is critical to managing risk», that the disconnect should not affect operations, and that OT staff should be trained to use it. A key switch on the panel door, or an input that enables the gateway, are two ways of putting that switch in the hands of the people on site. Which one works depends on your gateway: check its manual.
What gets recorded
For a company that falls under NIS2 in Italy, this isn’t optional. The baseline specifications of ACN, the Italian national cybersecurity agency (Determination 379907/2025, annex 1), require that all remote access and all access with administrative accounts be logged, and that an up-to-date list be kept of the systems reachable remotely, with a description of how they are accessed. Who must comply and from when is in NIS2 and industrial automation: what changes for programmers.
On the PLC there are two sources of records. First, the 12/2014 edition of the S7-1500 system manual says the CPU writes correct and incorrect password entries, and changes to access levels, to the diagnostics buffer. That edition is old, so check on your version. Second, the CPU’s Syslog client (6514/TCP, 514/UDP) is deactivated by default. From firmware V3.1 internal event collection can’t be disabled, but sending events to a server has to be configured.
Recording sessions as video or keystrokes is a different matter. In the primary sources I read (NIST SP 800-82, the 2026 CISA/NCSC principles, CISA’s 2025 mitigations) that recommendation isn’t there. What is there is «session monitoring» and a per-user trail. If you decide to record sessions, it’s your design choice, not a requirement you can cite.
Third-party access: one entry point, not one per vendor
If every vendor brings its own router, the line ends up with one VPN per vendor, each with its own credentials. The 2026 principles advise against this by name: rather than a VPN endpoint inside the OT network for each third party, «centralise remote access through a secure solution hosted in the DMZ». For vendor support they point to brokered connections through a gateway in a separate segment such as a DMZ.
The jump host appears in the same document, in the part on obsolete systems: «a hardened jump host to facilitate vendor support, ensuring access is controlled and monitored». It isn’t a general rule: it fits when the machine has a PC or software that can’t be updated.
Put in writing with the vendor: a break-glass account, if there is one, triggers the highest-criticality alarm every time it’s used; the isolation plan covers the switch from remote support to a site visit.
Who decides all this? The ISA guide to the IEC 62443 series is clear on roles: the asset owner, the organisation that runs the plant, is ultimately accountable for secure operation, and product suppliers and service providers support it. So the DMZ, the broker and the plant firewall rules belong to the asset owner. The machine builder asks for them; it can’t impose them.
Example scenario: two access models on Line P1
Line P1 is a fictional plant, the same one used throughout this series: a palletising line with an S7-1500 PLC (192.168.10.10), an HMI Comfort panel (192.168.10.20), two ET 200SP remote I/O stations (192.168.10.31 and 192.168.10.32), two switches, a service laptop (192.168.10.100) and a remote access gateway (192.168.10.2). The plant network is 10.20.0.0/16.
The line builder needs to work on the program remotely. Two ways of doing it:
| Item | Model A: «always on» | Model B: on request, brokered |
|---|---|---|
| Connection direction | Inbound: port forward on the plant router to 192.168.10.2 | Outbound: gateway 192.168.10.2 calls the broker in the plant DMZ |
| When it’s active | Always | Only after the Line P1 maintenance shift lead enables it |
| Credential | One «service» user shared by the builder’s service department | Named user for each engineer, with MFA on the broker |
| What it reaches | The whole 192.168.10.0/24: PLC, panel, ET 200SP, laptop | Only 192.168.10.10 on port 102/TCP, if the gateway supports filtering by address and port (check its manual) |
| Rights on the PLC | Full access with the project password | UMAC user with HMI access, or Read access if blocks must be read (still allows RUN/STOP); Full access for one job only, then removed |
| Expiry | None | Tunnel closed when the job ends; Runtime timeout on the UMAC user, to be tested on the bench |
| Who closes it | Nobody | The Line P1 maintenance shift lead, who removes the enable and logs it |
| Record | The router log, if anyone reads it | Per-user access log on the broker; CPU diagnostics buffer and Syslog |
| When the engineer leaves the builder | The shared password still works | Their broker account is disabled |
Model A is the easiest to commission. It’s also what Principle 6 of the 2026 guidance describes: in a flat OT network with VPN access for vendors, a contractor connecting to their equipment «could also gain access to all other devices on the network». On Line P1 that means the panel, both ET 200SP stations and the service laptop.
Model B needs three things the machine builder doesn’t control: the DMZ, the broker, and a person at the plant who opens and closes access. If the plant has no DMZ, you won’t get model B by changing the machine configuration. Ask the asset owner, or redesign the separation between machine network and plant network. That’s the subject of network segmentation and firewalls for a PLC machine.
Once model B is in service, test it on the bench or during a planned stop. With the shift lead’s enable off, the engineer must not be able to connect. Remotely, with the Read access user, a download to 192.168.10.10 must be refused, while switching to STOP succeeds (Read access allows it). From the tunnel, panel 192.168.10.20 must not answer. With the Line P1 settings from the access levels article, anyone reaching port 102 without logging in gets the Anonymous user’s rights, which is HMI access: test that case too.
What not to do
- Don’t forward ports to the PLC or the gateway. The connection must start from inside the plant.
- Don’t leave the tunnel up «because we need it». You need it for a job; then it closes.
- Don’t share the remote support user between engineers or between customers. You won’t know who did what, and you can’t revoke one person.
- Don’t give Full access by default to remote users, and don’t add one VPN per vendor inside the machine network.
- Don’t forget old profiles. In the 2021 Colonial Pipeline case NIST reports that the attackers encrypted IT systems «by exploiting a legacy VPN profile». There’s no evidence of direct impact on OT: the company chose to shut down physical operations.
- Don’t install a gateway without knowing who turns it off. You need a name, or at least a role, for whoever closes access and removes users.
Limits of this article
- I haven’t read the IEC 62443 text itself (it’s paid): on roles I follow the ISA introductory guide, and the 62443-3-3 requirements on remote access aren’t covered.
- UMAC needs TIA Portal V19 and CPU firmware V3.1 or later. Before that there were access levels, which don’t authenticate the user.
- Filters, switches and logs depend on the gateway model: read its manual.
- The NIS2 notes are not legal advice.
Sources
- NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3, Guide to Operational Technology (OT) Security, September 2023, §6.2.10, App. C.3 and App. F: nvlpubs.nist.gov
- NCSC-UK, CISA and partners, Secure connectivity principles for OT, January 2026: cisa.gov (PDF: ic3.gov)
- CISA and partners, Primary Mitigations to Reduce Cyber Threats to OT, 6 May 2025: cisa.gov
- CISA/FBI AA21-131A, DarkSide Ransomware, May 2021: cisa.gov
- Siemens, User Management & Access Control with TIA Portal V19, Entry ID 109973173, V1.0 07/2024: Siemens support
- Siemens, S7-1500 Web server Function Manual, 11/2025: Siemens support
- Siemens, S7-1500 Communication Function Manual, 11/2025, table 5-2: Siemens support
- Siemens, S7-1500/ET 200MP System Manual, 12/2014 edition, §8.2: Siemens support
- ISA Global Cybersecurity Alliance, Quick Start Guide: An Overview of ISA/IEC 62443 Standards: isagca.org
- ACN, Determination 379907 of 19/12/2025, baseline specifications, annex 1 (Italian): acn.gov.it
Last checked: 29 September 2026

Alessandro Strongoli has been programming PLCs and commissioning machines and plants for many years: S7-1200/S7-1500 with TIA Portal, WinCC panels, SINAMICS drives. Writing here since 2021. About the author


