Quick answer. PLC backup: for every machine, keep four things: the TIA Portal project (program and hardware configuration), the HMI project with the recipes actually in use, the firmware and TIA versions, and what you need to restore for real (licenses, installation media, the password for confidential PLC configuration data). Keep at least one copy disconnected from the network. If you have never restored a backup onto a bench CPU, you don’t know whether it works.
Getting a machine running again after ransomware takes things that don’t live in the PLC: the laptop with TIA Portal, the folder with the projects, the licenses, the passwords. If the ransomware has encrypted the PCs, recovery depends on what you saved beforehand. And where.
This article is the hands-on part of the PLC security series. The big picture is in the practical PLC cybersecurity guide for machine programmers; here we stick to backup and restore.
In particolar modo vedremo:
Why IT ransomware can stop the machine too
The case to know is Colonial Pipeline, May 2021. According to CISA/FBI advisory AA21-131A, DarkSide ransomware hit the company’s IT network and, at the time of the advisory, there was no indication that the OT networks had been directly affected. The company reported that it had proactively disconnected certain OT systems to keep them safe. NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3 classifies it as an indirect event: at the time of writing, with the investigation ongoing, no evidence of direct impact on OT, and the decision to shut down physical operations was the operator’s.
That is a shutdown chosen for containment, not an attack on the controllers. In our reading it is also exactly the situation machine backups exist for. When the stop is a choice, restarting means being able to show that what goes back on the network is clean. If the only copy of the project sat on the encrypted share, you have nothing to compare against.
At Colonial Pipeline the ransomware hit the IT network; with no evidence of direct impact on OT, the company itself decided to shut down physical operations.
PLC backup: what to save, the list for one machine
NIST asks for a list of all maintained backups, «including installation media, license keys, and configuration information». CISA, in the Colonial advisory, adds regularly updated «gold images» of critical systems and keeping source code or executables. Applied to a machine with an S7-1500 and an operator panel, the list looks like this.
| Item | Why recovery needs it | How you get it |
|---|---|---|
| TIA Portal project (program and hardware configuration) | The only basis for an online/offline comparison and for reloading the CPU | Copy of the project from the engineering PC, dated in the file name |
| CPU backup taken online | Captures what is actually running, even if the project on the PC has fallen behind | In TIA Portal, «Online» menu, «Load backup from online device» |
| Password for confidential PLC configuration data | On a CPU from FW V4.1, restoring requires the same password that was in place when the backup was created | In the shared password manager, next to the backup, never in one person’s head |
| HMI panel project | Without it, the replacement panel stays blank | Copy of the HMI project with the same date as the PLC project |
| Recipes and data changed on the machine | If operators edit recipes on the panel, the copy in the project is not the one in use | Export from the panel using the method your WinCC version provides (check on your version) |
| Firmware versions (CPU, panel, ET 200SP) and TIA Portal version | The same project can behave differently on different firmware (see below) | Inventory sheet, updated at every intervention |
| Installation media and license keys | To reinstall TIA Portal on a clean PC without downloading anything over the compromised network | Offline copy of installers and licenses |
| Image of the engineering PC | Rebuild the service laptop without reinstalling everything from scratch | A «gold image» refreshed whenever the TIA version changes |
Why the firmware version belongs in the backup
Three lines from the S7-1500 Communication Function Manual (edition 11/2025) make the point.
- A project created with TIA Portal older than V17 and loaded onto a CPU with firmware V2.9 behaves like a configuration on a V2.8 CPU. Secure PG/HMI communication arrives with V2.9, so in our reading it won’t switch itself on for that spare.
- A CPU from firmware V3.0 loaded with a predecessor project (firmware below V3.0) behaves like the CPU in that project: SNMP is on and the «public» and «private» community strings are in effect.
- From firmware V4.1, if the password for confidential configuration data at restore time is not the one used when the backup was taken, the backup cannot be restored.
If the spare arrives with firmware other than what you recorded, you find out before you download, not after. The CISA guide on OT asset inventory also lists firmware and software version among the attributes to record.
Where to keep it: three layers, one of them offline
NIST describes a «backup-in-depth» approach with several layers, for example local, facility and disaster. For PLC files it recommends keeping logic and configuration at an off-site, geographically diverse location as well. CISA is blunter: backups should be isolated from network connections. Siemens’ Operational Guidelines add protection of project files at rest, with file system rights or an encrypted drive container, and encryption in transit.
| Layer | Where | What it’s for | Weak spot |
|---|---|---|---|
| Local | Service laptop or engineering PC | Fast restore after a hardware fault | It’s on the network: ransomware can reach it |
| Facility, offline | Encrypted external drive in a locked cabinet, plugged in only to copy | Recovery after a cyber incident | Only as good as the date of the last copy |
| Off-site | Second copy in another building or site | Fire, flood, theft | Needs a refresh rule, or it goes stale |
The rule that matters: at least one copy must be unreachable from the network at the moment of the attack. A shared folder that is always mounted is not an offline layer, even if it lives on a different server.
How to test the restore
NIST puts it plainly: test the restoration process from backup data as part of contingency plan testing. In the backup register, next to each item, write one of two sentences: «restore tested on DD/MM/YYYY» or «copy present, restore never tested». «Backup OK» tells nobody anything.
The test happens on the bench. Never on the running line.
- Take a spare CPU with the same order number. Siemens’ manual says a replacement CPU should not have a configuration or a configured password.
- Install TIA Portal at the recorded version, from offline media, on a PC that has never touched the plant network.
- Open the project from the offline layer. If it won’t open, or asks for a TIA version you don’t have, you’ve found the problem for free.
- Load the backup onto the bench CPU with the confidential-data password taken from the password manager, not from somebody’s memory.
- Run an online/offline comparison between project and CPU: they must match.
- Load the project onto a bench panel, if you have one, and check that it talks to the CPU. Check certificate validity too: once a certificate has expired, the manual says a secure connection from an HMI or programming device to the CPU can no longer be established.
- Write down the date, who did it, and how long it took. The time is what whoever plans the recovery needs.
Example scenario: Line P1 after ransomware on the plant network
Line P1 is a fictional plant, the same one used throughout this series: a palletizing line with an S7-1500 (192.168.10.10), a Comfort HMI panel (192.168.10.20), two ET 200SP stations (192.168.10.31 and 192.168.10.32), two switches, a service laptop (192.168.10.100) and a remote access gateway (192.168.10.2). The plant network is 10.20.0.0/16. In the scenario the project is in TIA Portal V21 and the CPU runs firmware V4.1: made-up values, chosen because with V4.1 the confidential-data password becomes a restore dependency.
On a Monday morning the office PCs on 10.20.0.0/16 show a ransom note. The shared projects folder is encrypted. Line P1 is still running. The line’s backup register, filled in beforehand, reads:
| Item | Where | Date | Owner | Restore |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| TIA V21 project (PLC and HMI) | Encrypted external drive, department cabinet | 14/09/2026 | Line programmer | Tested 21/09/2026 on bench CPU |
| CPU backup taken online | Same drive | 14/09/2026 | Line programmer | Tested 21/09/2026 |
| Confidential-data password | Shared password manager | 14/09/2026 | Maintenance manager | Used in the 21/09 test |
| Recipes exported from the panel | Same drive | 14/09/2026 | Shift supervisor | Copy present, restore never tested |
| Image of laptop 192.168.10.100 | Second site | 02/07/2026 | Plant IT | Copy present, restore never tested |
Recovery checklist
- Isolation. The plant operator decides, not the programmer. The link between 10.20.0.0/16 and the line network is cut and gateway 192.168.10.2 is disabled. NIST notes that the ability to disconnect remote access is critical, and that disconnecting it should not impact OT operations.
- Service laptop. 192.168.10.100 was on the office network on Friday, so it’s not used. It gets rebuilt from the 02/07 image and TIA V21 is reinstalled from offline media. That item was never tested, and this is where you pay for it: allow for it in the timeline.
- Backup. The drive comes out of the cabinet and is opened only on the rebuilt laptop. Dates and versions are checked against the register.
- Compare before you download. Online/offline comparison between the 14/09 project and CPU 192.168.10.10. If they match, nothing gets downloaded to the CPU. That’s our call, not a written rule: downloading a backup onto a CPU that already matches the project adds risk and removes none.
- If they don’t match. Stop the line in a controlled way and restore the 14/09 backup with the password from the manager. If the CPU has to be replaced, the spare must arrive with no configuration and no password.
- Panel. Check that panel 192.168.10.20 talks to the CPU and reload the exported recipes. There was no test for this one: check the recipes by hand with the shift supervisor before producing.
- Back on the network. Last, and the remote access gateway after everything else.
- Reporting. If the company is in scope of NIS2, the directive requires an early warning within 24 hours of becoming aware of a significant incident; in Italy, Legislative Decree 138/2024 sends it to CSIRT Italia. The company decides, not whoever programs the machine. More in the article on what NIS2 changes for programmers. This point is not legal advice.
- Register. Record what was restored, from which copy, who did it and how long it took.
Among the measures NIS2 lists in Article 21 is business continuity, «such as backup management and disaster recovery». In our reading, a register like the one above is the kind of document a customer in scope will ask its machine supplier for.
What not to do
- Keep the only copy on the network share. If the share gets encrypted, the copy goes with it. That is why CISA wants backups isolated from network connections.
- Open the backup stick on the suspect PC. In 2010 ICS-CERT described malware targeting Siemens control software that activated when a USB drive was simply viewed in Windows Explorer, without AutoRun.
- Leave the confidential-data password with one person. From firmware V4.1, without that password the backup won’t restore. How to set and manage CPU passwords is covered in the article on S7-1500 passwords and access levels.
- Test the restore on the running line. Use the bench.
- Write «backup OK». Write the date of the copy and whether the restore was tested.
- Reopen remote access first because «the vendor needs to take a look». The gateway comes back last; how to set it up is in the article on secure PLC remote access.
Limits of this article
- Command names («Load backup from online device») come from Siemens documentation, edition 11/2025. Your TIA Portal version may label the menu differently: check on your version.
- I don’t describe backup and restore of a Comfort panel: I haven’t verified it against an official source for this article. Use the documentation for your panel and your WinCC version.
- Running an online/offline comparison before reloading is a practice we propose, not a Siemens, NIST or CISA requirement. It tells you whether program and configuration in the CPU match the project; it is not an integrity check of the device.
- Menu paths and firmware-dependent behaviour change between TIA and firmware versions. Check the manual for the CPU you actually have.
Sources
- NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3, Guide to Operational Technology (OT) Security, September 2023: §5.3.2.1, §6.2.4.3, App. C.3, App. F (AC-17(9)).
- CISA/FBI, AA21-131A, DarkSide Ransomware, May 2021.
- US-CERT, TA17-163A, CrashOverride Malware (offline copies of install media).
- ICS-CERT, ICSA-10-201-01C, USB Malware Targeting Siemens Control Software, 2010.
- CISA and partners, Foundations for OT Cybersecurity: Asset Inventory Guidance, 13 August 2025.
- Siemens, S7-1500 Communication Function Manual, A5E03735815-AN, 11/2025.
- Siemens, S7-1500/ET 200MP System Manual, edition 12/2014 (online/offline comparison).
- Siemens, Cybersecurity for Industry – Operational Guidelines, version 2.2.1, April 2024.
- Directive (EU) 2022/2555, text on Cellar, Articles 21 and 23.
Last checked: 29 September 2026

Alessandro Strongoli has been programming PLCs and commissioning machines and plants for many years: S7-1200/S7-1500 with TIA Portal, WinCC panels, SINAMICS drives. Writing here since 2021. About the author
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